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Are We Reading Russia Right?1
Nicolai N. Petro
ABSTRACT: 
Despite the passage of time, Cold War patterns of thinking about Russia 
show no sign of weakening in America. To avoid repeating the mistakes of the 
past, we need to look at Russian society in a fundamentally different light. We 
must learn to appreciate it as a democracy that shares key similarities, as well 
as differences, with the West.
Since the lion’s share of attention is devoted to Russia’s democratic 
shortcomings, I would like to draw attention to Vladimir Putin’s accom-
plishment in this area.
I am not arguing that the mainstream view of Russia is entirely 
wrong, but rather that it is incomplete. It cannot help but be incomplete 
when the story of an entire nation is boiled down to just one person. While 
there is far more to Russia than Putin, it is also true Putin has become the 
avatar of Russia’s post-Soviet identity. I will therefore discuss the scope of 
Russia’s political and legal transformation under Putin, then ask why some 
of his most notable accomplishments have been largely overlooked by the 
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media. I will conclude with some suggestions on how to promote a more 
balanced view of Russia.
For many Americans, the phrase Russian democracy is an oxymoron. 
While we tend to believe that most people are capable of democracy, in prac-
tice, generations of hostility—first toward the Russia Empire, then toward 
the Soviet Union—have firmly established Russia in the public mind as a 
nation incapable of democracy. As the late historian Martin Malia wrote, 
our antagonism toward Russia did not arise with communism, so there was 
no reason for it to disappear with communism’s collapse.2
So entrenched is this animosity that when candidate Donald Trump 
naively asked, “Wouldn’t it be nice if we actually got along with Russia 
and China?”3 America’s foreign policy establishment treated the idea as 
bordering on treason.4 
One does not have to look far for the reasons. As noted social critic 
Paul Berman observed, “Hostility to Russia is the oldest continuous 
foreign-policy tradition in the United States.” Although Americans like to 
think of our conflict as a product of the Cold War, “it is in fact eternal” 
says Berman. “The struggle of democracy versus czarism, even if for a few 
years czarism called itself Communism.” That is what makes the notion of 
friendship with Putin, or any Russia leader, so offensive. Berman asserts, 
“the whole of American history would seem to say that such an about-face 
is impossible.”5
If Berman is right, it helps to explain why, when Vladimir Putin 
became the first global leader to publicly stand with the United States after 
the terrorist attacks of 9/11, America’s political and intellectual elite did 
not quite know how to respond.
Influential columnist William Safire warned, “We should not forget 
that once up on its hind legs, the Russian bear will growl again.”6 Dr. 
Richard Pipes, Professor of History at Harvard University, writing in the 
Wall Street Journal, reminded readers how quickly we were disillusioned 
at the end of World War II. “Given the shallowness of the domestic base 
for Mr. Putin’s pro-Western policy,” he pointed out, “the latter can quickly 
reverse itself.”7 
But the prize for casting Putin’s gesture of friendship in its most 
sinister light must surely go to Washington Post journalist Anne Applebaum, 
who wrote, “Putin’s commitment to America’s war on terrorism was made 
so abruptly, and is so clearly personal, that I suspect it comes from some-
thing deeper: his racism.”8 
A quarter century has passed since the fall of the Soviet Union, and 
little has changed. When president Putin invited the children of U.S. 
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diplomatic personnel in Moscow to celebrate Christmas at the Kremlin, 
after Russian diplomats and their families had been expelled from the U.S., 
the Guardian’s Luke Harding explained that this was a veiled threat on their 
lives, “for those who were able to decode it.”9 
It often seems that the further we distance ourselves from the end 
of the Cold War, the closer we come to its revival. How can this be, when 
Russia now officially embraces a market economy, and most of the political 
and social values of the West? Wasn’t the Cold War a fight against commu-
nism, for Western values? 
The answer has much to do with the media’s obsession with one 
man—Vladimir Putin—an obsession that media critic Stephen Boykewich 
in 2009 called “a national affliction in the US, [helping to] create a perfect 
storm of anti-Russian sentiment in the Western media.”10 
I am hardly the first to point this out. Stephen Cohen, professor 
emeritus of Russian studies at both Princeton and New York University, 
has long challenged journalists to stop what he calls “the pointless demoni-
zation” of Putin. His colleague at Columbia University, Padma Desai, calls 
this “Putinphobia.”11 These calls have been echoed by Henry Kissinger 
and Jack Matlock, as well as Tony 
Brenton and Roderic Braithwaite, 
two of Britain’s former ambassadors to 
Russia. Former British diplomat and 
intelligence analyst Alastair Crooke 
recently observed that “The compul-
sive hatred of President Putin in elite 
western circles has surpassed anything 
witnessed during the Cold War.”12 
Canada’s former ambassador to Russia 
Christopher Westdal says that the “stan-
dard portrait [of Putin] is so wrong that 
it’s hard to keep one’s balance taking 
swings at such a straw man.”13 
Ambassador Westdal has a point. 
One cannot hope to understand Russia 
properly when it is presented to us in monotone fragments: Russian 
submarines in Swedish waters; Russian aggression in Ukraine; and now, of 
course, Russian propaganda, which, much like the Holy Spirit, “is every-
where present, and filleth all things.”14 
The problem is that these fragments represent only a small frac-
tion of reality. A fitting comparison would be media coverage of America 
One cannot hope to 
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when it is presented to us in 
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much like the Holy Spirit, 
“is everywhere present, and 
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focusing on soaring murder rates, the collapsing middle class, race hatred, 
and Donald Trump. These are all parts of America, but the full picture is 
more complicated. In the brief space allotted to me, therefore, I’d like to 
complicate our picture of Russia. 
Under the Obama administration, much hope was attached to the 
“reset.” From its inception, however, the reset rested on a flawed assump-
tion—namely that there was a rift between the values of the Kremlin 
and the Russian people that the United States could exploit. As Michael 
McFaul, the policy’s architect explained, the purpose of the reset was “to 
establish a direct relationship with the Russian people” over the Kremlin’s 
head.15 As a result, a golden opportunity to alter the course of Russian-
American relations was lost to political expediency. 
I believe that things might have been very different, had President 
Obama been advised to say a few kind words about Russian democracy, 
instead of trying to use it as a Trojan Horse. 
He might have noted, for example, that for about a decade now, 
more than a dozen political parties regularly compete in Russian elections, 
with an average of between twelve and fifteen candidates vying for a single 
seat.16 Or, that popular gubernatorial elections, abolished by Putin in the 
aftermath of the 2004 terrorist attacks in Beslan, were reinstated in 2012. 
Or, that the bar for party representation in Russia’s national parliament, the 
Duma, has been repeatedly been lowered and that the number of nation-
ally registered political parties has now risen to more than seventy.17
One result of this expansion of political life, as the Washington Post 
recently noted, is that candidates opposed to Putin are running—and 
winning. Simply by automating the online registration process, anti-Putin 
candidates were able to win 266 city council seats in Moscow, and take 
control of nearly two-dozen city districts.18 According to Yulia Galiamina, 
one of the coordinators of this movement, the same thing has been taking 
place in Pskov and “in many unnoticed Russian towns and villages”19 for 
two whole election cycles, right under Putin’s nose.20 
Of course, this civic activism did not arise from nowhere. Through 
what became known in the mid-2000s as “the Putin Plan,” president 
Putin laid the groundwork for a dramatic expansion of civic initiative 
during his first two terms as president.21 During this period the number 
of non-governmental organizations expanded from 100,000 to more than 
600,000, with at least another 600,000 active unofficially.22 The latest 
surveys suggest that the more than ten million Russians are involved in 
some form organized volunteer activity, roughly ten percent of the adult 
population.23 Such a high level of civic activity, on a par per capita with 
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France, is, as NGO researchers Deborah Javeline and Sarah Lindemann-
Komarova point out, sustained by multiple funding sources—government, 
businesses, and private individuals. Foreign funding, even at its height back 
in 2009, never accounted for more than 7% of the total.24 
One wonders how different our view of Russia would be today, if it 
were more widely known that several of Russia’s largest daily newspapers, 
like Vedomosti, Kommersant, and Nezavisimaya gazeta, are staunchly anti-
Putin and reach tens of millions of readers. Novaya gazeta’s web site alone 
garners more than twenty million views a month.25 As Konstantin Sonin, 
formerly a columnist for Vedomosti and now a professor at the University 
of Chicago, once explained, “Any newspaper that wants to gain a broad 
readership in Moscow needs to take an anti-Putin and anti-United Russia 
stance… Otherwise, it will lose subscribers, newsstand sales, and adver-
tisers.”26
Anti-Putinism has long been the norm on Russia’s most popular 
radio station, Ekho Moskvy, and on opposition television channels like Rain 
TV and RBC. But these are not the only venues for opposition voices. As 
presidential candidate Ksenia Sobchak’s campaign advisor recently pointed 
out to CNN, opposition candidates now “speak freely on Kremlin-owned 
state television about Russia’s internal problems and their ideas for how 
to fix entrenched systems of corruption…. Today, political candidates’ 
appearances form a more regular part of the TV schedule, and they have 
the freedom to say quite a lot.”27 
No one who follows the mainstream media in Russia is therefore 
surprised to read articles accusing the Russian army of having shot down 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17, linking Putin to various money laundering 
schemes, opposing Russian support for the government of Syria, referring 
to the rebels in Ukraine as “criminals,” or abandoning Russian mercenaries 
in the field.28
Yet, instead of noting these accomplishments, we in the West routinely 
hear that three-quarters of Russians watch “state-controlled television,” 
usually without mentioning that only three percent of Russia’s hundred 
thousand media outlets are actually state-owned, or that the most common 
source of news for persons under thirty-four is not television, but the 
internet.29 As Russian media scholar Stephen Hutchings puts it, in today’s 
Russian internet domain, which has more socially active internet users than 
any other country in Europe, a paradoxical situation has emerged where 
“arch Putin-opponent, Alexei Navalny, co-exists with government trolls, and 
the full spectrum of political opinion is accessible at the click of a mouse.”30 
Russia’s media ecology is thus much more complex than is commonly 
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assumed, Hutchings argues. It “is a product both of the digital age and 
of neoliberal economics… shaped as much by commercial as by political 
imperatives. Deviant meanings are therefore sometimes generated not at 
the peripheries of Russia’s media landscape but at its centre.”31
Such diversity apparently now reaches well beyond such liberal 
bastions as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Ekaterinburg, as Christian Science 
Monitor correspondent Fred Weir found on a recent trip to Voronezh. 
Even in this famously conservative region in Russia’s ‘Red Belt’ he found a 
remarkable diversity of opinion in the local media, fueled in part by some 
70 internet news sites in Voronezh, “only one of which is state-funded, and 
several of which self-identify as “opposition.”32 
We can begin to glimpse how much of Russia’s civic progress we have 
missed, if we examine a critical aspect of any democracy—the rule of law.
Let us start by noting that it was Vladimir Putin who introduced 
several key elements of modern criminal justice to Russia. These include 
habeus corpus, a juvenile justice system, trial by jury, bailiffs, and justices 
of the peace—institutions that have taken other countries decades, if not 
centuries, to put in place. And that was just his first term.
During Putin’s second term, courts struck down compensation limits 
for government negligence, strengthened the rights of defendants to excul-
patory evidence, provided clearer guidelines on secrecy, and ruled that 
compensation must be paid to persons who are arrested without merit.33 
Closed judicial proceedings and pretrial detention centers have been all but 
eliminated, privacy protections for individuals expanded, and 24,000 free 
legal aid centers created.34 
In December 2016, Putin signed into law a significant expansion of 
judicial review. The unwillingness of local officials to implement new, liberal 
legislation has been a long-standing problem in Russia. The Constitutional 
Court has now been given the authority to preemptively provide direct 
guidance to local officials on how to interpret laws that, in the Court’s 
judgment, are not being properly implemented.35 
It is a sign of growing public confidence in the judicial system that 
the number of persons turning to courts for redress of civil grievances has 
gone from one million in 1998, to six million in 2004, to ten million in 
2012,36 to more than seventeen million in 2016.37 
And foreign investors seem to be taking note. Since 2014, the 
number of suits brought on behalf of foreign companies has tripled, while 
judgments in their favor have risen from fifty-nine percent to eighty-three 
percent of the total.38 This may help to explain Russia’s dramatic rise in the 
World Bank’s “Ease of Doing Business Index,” from 124th place in 2012 to 
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35th place in 2018.39
Alas, you will not find such information commonly cited in main-
stream Western media outlets. There, the narrative seems to be stuck on a 
handful of celebrity cases, like that of Mikhail Khodorkovsky, the former 
head of Russia’s largest private oil company, Yukos. Despite Khodorkovsky’s 
conviction on multiple counts of fraud and tax evasion, it is still common 
to see his trial described as politically motivated, even though in September 
2011, the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) ruled unanimously 
that Russia had not misused the legal process to destroy Yukos and seize 
its assets.40 It should also be noted that the number of complaints filed by 
Russian citizens before the ECHR has fallen by 61 percent since 2010, and 
is now lower than that of many Western European countries.41 
However, the most impressive aspect of Russia’s legal reforms is that, 
in the face of threats of terrorism and secession, not only has Russia created 
a modern legal system, it has also deliberately enhanced its more humane 
aspects.42
For example, since Putin introduced the new code of criminal proce-
dures, acquittal rates by judges have more than doubled, and are now at a 
level comparable to that of the United States. Acquittal rates in jury trials 
are three times higher, which has resulted in roughly a quarter of those 
indicted being acquitted.43 As a result, the number of persons incarcerated 
in Russia has fallen by almost forty percent since 2001, and the number of 
minors in prison has fallen from 19,000 to just 1,000.44
Another sign of Russia’s progress toward an independent judiciary 
was overturning the conviction of Ildar Dadin, the only person convicted 
to a prison term for repeated violations of the law on illegal public protests. 
In its ruling the Constitutional Court firmly established the principle that 
the right to public protest may only be denied to preserve essential public 
services.45 No other criteria, the court underscored, may be applied.46 
Thus, while conventional wisdom scoffs at the independence of the 
Russian judiciary, if one measures independence by the number of times 
that courts rule against the government, and in favor of private plaintiffs in 
civil cases, then Russian courts are independent more than seventy percent 
of the time.47 
By no means am I suggesting that Russia’s legal system is perfect. No 
legal system is. But perhaps we should also consider how much has been 
accomplished in the last two decades, as legendary human rights activist 
Ludmila Alekseyeva did when she was honored last December with the 
National Award for Outstanding Lifetime Achievements in Human Rights 
Activity: 
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The USSR disappeared 25 years ago and we now live in the Russian 
Federation that has a different Constitution. It recognises human 
rights as a supreme value and compels the state to protect them. 
The human rights movement is no longer a handful of dissidents 
as it was half a century ago…. The institution of Human Rights 
Commissioner…is a real step towards the observance and protec-
tion of human rights by the state, the Presidential Council for Civil 
Society and Human Rights is also an important human rights insti-
tution… These are joint steps our society and state are taking towards 
building a truly democratic, legal and social state in Russia…the 
obstacles short-sighted politicians set on the path of civil society…
[can] slow this process down, but they cannot stop it…. One such 
generation has already grown up…and we will not need another 25 
years for our civil society to ripen.48
So, why are these accomplishments not better known in the West? 
One reason is the persistence of a peculiar standard when it comes to 
reporting about Russia. 
A few years ago, two leading German newspapers, FAZ and Die 
Zeit, announced they would no longer maintain full-time correspondents 
in Moscow. They explained their decision to Deutsche Welle as follows: 
“The list of mandatory topics for German journalists working in Russia is 
predictable: suppression of dissent, the adoption of antidemocratic laws, 
economic hardships. Not the sort of topics that automatically guarantee 
reader’s interest.”49 Reading this list, one wonders if German readers might 
not be better off without the kind of reporting that knows a priori which 
topics are mandatory, and how they are to be presented.
Apparently, it is not at all uncommon for Western press outlets to 
have a list of this sort when it comes to Russia. Early in 2018, the Wall 
Street Journal began to search for a new Moscow Bureau Chief. Their ad 
said they were looking for someone to describe “Putin’s role as a champion 
of so-called illiberal democracy who has become a beacon for right-wing 
politicians across Europe and even in the U.S. His traditional conservatism 
of blood and religion resonates amid economic uncertainty.”50 The adver-
tisement did not describe these as issues to be explored, but as dogmas to 
be affirmed.
Another perennial problem that makes objective reporting about 
Russia difficult is the tendency to omit information that conflicts with the 
negative storyline. For example, stories about penalties for illegal public 
gatherings, rarely found it necessary to mention that the Constitutional 
Court had struck down portions of the law, and mandated that the fines 
associated with it be lowered.51
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Another example is reporting about legislation that requires Russian 
NGOs that receive foreign funding and engage in political activity to 
register as foreign agents, but that fails to mention that since 2016, the 
number of NGOs registered as foreign agents has shrunk by almost two-
thirds. These types of NGOs comprise less than one half a percent of all 
registered NGOs in the country.52 Some see malice at work here, but social 
psychology offers a time-tested explanation—paradigm blindness. 
Paradigm blindness occurs when 
an event remains invisible because the 
observer has no context or expression 
for naming it. Simply put, Americans 
cannot talk about Russia as a democ-
racy because there is no frame of refer-
ence for Russian democracy in their 
minds. 
Journalists are no exception to 
paradigm blindness. Indeed, they are 
its first victims. A journalist’s desire to 
report accurately provides no special 
preparation for the uncomfortable task 
of constructing fresh intellectual frame-
works. Since there is no social or media 
context for describing Russia as a democracy, journalists rely on existing 
stereotypes to describe rapidly changing realities. Behavioral researchers 
call such reliance “availability bias.”53 
Some media researchers, like Murray Edelman, W. Lance Bennett, and 
John D. Klockner, argue that such reliance produces “category mistakes.”54 
Such a mistake can occur when people continue to think in rhetorical 
categories that perpetuate the very problem they are trying to resolve—in 
this case, the problem of how to describe a Russia that is becoming more 
like the West, within rhetorical categories that define Russia as the West’s 
antithesis. 
We see the damage that is being done by persistent paradigm blind-
ness and the resulting category mistakes in three important social trends 
that distinguish Russia from the West. In each of these trends, our focus on 
the differences actually distracts us from recognizing significant similarities. 
One such trend is the vastly different perceptions of Putin’s legacy in 
Russia and in the West. 
Many in the West seem quite confident of Russia’s imminent 
economic collapse.55 The optimists in this group believe that, after the 
Paradigm blindness occurs 
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democracy in their minds. 
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collapse, the Russian people will blame Putin and reject his policies.56 The 
pessimists feel that Russians must be forced, even at the risk of war, “into 
developing a new national identity.” But confounding these analysts, Putin 
has responded to fluctuations in global oil prices, the devaluation of the 
ruble, and Western economic sanctions by expanding social programs and 
investing in the Russian economy. Pensions have risen tenfold since 2000, 
and women can still retire with full pensions at fifty-five, men at sixty—
even as average life expectancy has increased by more than six years, to 
72.6.57 
In addition, Russia provides maternity payments, which were at one-
point worth as much as $13,000, tax-free to new families, single parents, 
and those who adopt children. This year, in an ambitious move to help 
the working poor enter the middle class, the government plans to raise 
the minimum wage to the living wage.58 To give you a sense of what this 
means, if this were done for a family of three with one employed parent, 
living in the Boston-Cambridge-Newton area of Massachusetts, it would 
result in an hourly wage rate of $25.25, which is more than double the 
state’s minimum wage.59 
The combination of a robust social safety net, official unemployment 
of 5.2 percent, and an annual inflation rate at 2.5 percent, suggests that 
anyone running against Putin’s legacy is bound to have an uphill battle.60 
What Western analysts who call for more toughness with Russia seem 
unable to grasp is that Putin’s true power base lies not with the oligarchs, 
but with the Russian people.61 Any approach to Russia that overlooks this 
is simply out of touch with reality. 
A second divergence with the West involves multiculturalism. In 
recent years the political leaders of France, Germany, and the United 
Kingdom have all explicitly repudiated multiculturalism and suggested 
that they no longer regard their minority ethnic and religious communities 
as distinct political stakeholders in their societies.62 Some would say that 
the United States has now joined them.
Meanwhile, however, both presidents Medvedev and Putin have 
reaffirmed Russia’s multicultural national identity.63 But, whereas Western 
governments promote a global order that is largely acultural and secular, 
Russia has embraced a brand of multiculturalism that prizes cultural and 
religious diversity among nations as much as it prizes diversity within 
nations. 
Culturally, Russia’s elite has always identified itself with Western culture. 
Increasingly, however, it sees itself as that part of the West that comprehends 
the futility of what British philosopher John Gray calls “hyper-liberalism.”64 
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Having experienced the Bolshevik Revolution, it now seeks to establish a 
political consensus around the values that the West shares with non-Western 
states. This approach can best be described not as opposition to liberalism, 
but as a different form of liberalism, one divorced from Western hegemony 
and open to non-western traditions and influences.65 
Russian political theorist Boris Mezhuev calls this approach “civili-
zational realism.”66 It differs from classical realism in that it recognizes the 
importance of values in international affairs; and it differs from classical 
liberalism in that it sees value in the diversity of cultural communities, as 
well as individuals. 
This brings me to the most widely misunderstood difference between 
Russia and the West—the public’s attitude toward religion politics. 
According to a 2011 Ipsos survey of 23 European countries, Russia has 
become the most religious country in Europe.67 Since the fall of commu-
nism, public attitudes toward religion in the Eastern and Western halves of 
Europe have in a way flipped. This became apparent in the vastly different 
Russian and Western reactions to the church invasion organized by the 
punk band “Pussy Riot.”68 Now, it is no longer the West’s sole purview 
to complain of a “values gap” with Russia, referring primarily to human 
rights. Russian elites also complain of a values gap with the West, referring 
to the latter’s lack of respect for religious traditions. 
These three trends in Russian society—a broad social consensus, 
multiculturalism, and desecularization—are also very much a part of 
Europe’s cultural identity. They span from East to West, sharing a common 
vision of traditional values. 
Former president Dmitry Medvedev reminded Europeans of this 
common heritage during a state visit to Germany in 2008. “Russian and 
European democracy,” he pointed out, “share common roots. We share 
the same set of values and the same sources of law: Roman, Germanic and 
French law…. We have a common history and we share the same humani-
tarian values. This common thinking is the foundation that enables us to 
speak not just the same legal or business language today but, I hope, also 
the same political language.”69
Medvedev’s words reveal a simple and straightforward path to 
preventing a new Cold War: remembering our common heritage. There is 
a need to reflect upon parts of European history that we in the West all too 
often forget—the inheritance of the Eastern Roman Empire—so that the 
full legacy of Greece and Rome can become part of our cultural discourse 
and inform our politics. 
For centuries, a stunted version of European identity that sees little 
the fletcher forum of world affairs142
vol.42:2 summer 2018
of value in the thousand-year history of Byzantium has prevented many 
Western Europeans from fully embracing their Slavic and Orthodox neigh-
bors. The maligning of Byzantium, as the former Librarian of Congress, 
James H. Billington once aptly observed, is “a fixture of all the mistaken 
conventional wisdom” about Russia and Eastern Europe.70 
The importance of re-establishing this bond cannot be overstated. Its 
fragility should highlight the importance of dialogue, and joint endeavors 
that draw attention to our similarities rather than our differences. It is these 
shared identities, as J.H. Adam Watson, one of the founders of The English 
School of international relations, used to say, that teach us to eschew self-
aggrandizement, to act with self-restraint, and to avoid tragedy.71 
But there is a more immediate threat to comity among nations that 
education about our common heritage alone cannot fix. It stems from inces-
sant popular portrayals of Russia as “a 
space of incompetence… a country not 
yet ready to take care of its people or to 
join the ranks of the ‘civilized’ world.”72 
Russia’s exclusion from “civilization” 
allows it to be cast in a dark light that, 
intentionally or not, heightens the 
threat of serious conflict.73
This demonization appears clearly 
in U.S. government officials casually 
comparing Russia’s president to Mussolini and Hitler,74 and when Putin is 
described by a former secretary of state as “truly evil.”75 It then seems quite 
reasonable for another to add that he “by definition doesn’t have a soul” 
and is a “killer.”76 Worst of all, the criminalization of Putin has occasionally 
been used, by extension, to criminalize all Russians. Consider, for example, 
the request by April Doss, the Democrats’ Senior Counsel for the Senate 
Select Committee on Intelligence on the Russia investigation, for informa-
tion on anyone believed to be “of Russian nationality or descent.”77 
We should hardly be surprised that it has come to this, when 
prominent figures like James Clapper, the former Director of National 
Intelligence,78 and Bob Corker, the chairman of the Senate’s Committee 
on Foreign Relations,79 refer to Russian behavior as genetically coded. As 
Jonathan Turley, a law professor at George Washington University, writes, 
the search for evidence of Russian intervention has moved inexorably from 
moneylines, to codelines, to bloodlines.80 
In this context, the exasperation of people like Robert D. Kaplan—a 
self-professed lover of Russian literature, art, and music—seems perfectly 
Russia’s exclusion from 
“civilization” allows it 
to be cast in a dark light 
that, intentionally or not, 
heightens the threat of serious 
conflict.
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understandable. Not long ago, Kaplan lamented in The National Interest, 
that all those who love Russia eventually wind up “realizing the utter 
impossibility of any good ever coming out of Russia...and throw up their 
hands at the beastly unchangeableness of Russia.”81 I suggest that America’s 
inability to come up with anything better than containment,82 a policy 
designed for the USSR, a country that has not existed for more than a 
quarter century, is rooted in this very perception of Russians as “beastly.” 
As if to confirm this view, the Washington Post recently quoted 
Michel Sulick, a former head of the CIA’s National Clandestine Service 
and a former Moscow station chief, as saying “The Russians only under-
stand one thing — when the boot is on their neck, and you keep pressing 
down.”83 Meanwhile, his CIA colleague John Sipher, a former Station 
Chief in Russia, asked, “How can one not be a Russophobe? Russian soft 
power is political warfare. Hard power is invading neighbors, hiding the 
death of civilians with chemical weapons and threatening with doomsday 
nuclear weapons. And they kill the opposition at home. Name something 
positive.”84
I have tried to show that there are quite a few positive things one 
could talk about. The persistent failure to do so, moreover, feeds the peri-
odic binges of political hysteria that, Richard Hofstadter described in his 
classic essay, “The Paranoid Style in American Politics.”85
A productive response requires a sober diagnosis. Russophobia is a 
chronic condition for American elites, because it allows us to see ourselves 
as we would most like to be seen — as valiantly engaged in a global struggle 
against evil.86 It is now so much a part of America’s identity that it is unlikely 
to ever be cured. It can, however, be managed. It needs to be managed so 
that the U.S. can get through its periodic bouts of paranoia without doing 
irreparable damage to America’s interests overseas.
Eventually, the current wave paranoia will subside, if it does not lead 
to war. Its current virulence, however, may yet serve a useful purpose, if 
it forces a candid conversation about historical Russophobia, and how it 
burdens American foreign policy.
At this point, even readers willing to concede that Russia is not always 
portrayed fairly by the media might object, “But what about Russian 
meddling in the 2016 U.S. presidential elections? What about the hacking 
of emails and manipulation of social media? Surely, we must respond force-
fully to such brazenly hostile acts.” 
These are indeed very serious allegations, and it is in everyone’s interest 
to get to the bottom of what actually took place.87 But my point from the 
outset has been that we rarely, if ever, get to see the full picture in a timely 
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manner. How political leaders respond to crises, therefore, depends largely 
on their preconceptions about whom they are dealing with, and these are 
driven not by facts, but by narratives.88
Two radically different narratives have driven interpretations of the 
available facts in all our recent confrontations with Russia.
In one narrative, Russia is presumed guilty. This presumption makes 
the search for specific proof of Russian government involvement largely 
superfluous. This was displayed with exceptional clarity in the Skripal 
poisoning case, when Boris Johnson, Britain’s foreign secretary, insisted 
that only Russia could have produced the presumed nerve agent Novichok, 
even though the head of Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical 
Weapons (OPCW) disagrees.89 As Johnson put it, “the obvious Russian-
ness of the weapon” suffices to indicate the culprit.90 
In the other narrative, there is no presumption of Russian guilt. In 
its absence, skeptics typically do not see enough evidence to blame Russia. 
These competing narratives serve to frame competing policy options. 
The former leaves no option but conflict with Russia. In this narra-
tive, Russia cannot become a full member of the global community, until 
it rejects its past and embraces Western values. This “will have nothing to 
do with the United States,” says Vanity Fair author Peter Savodnik, “it will 
have everything to do with Russia transcending Russia.”91
By contrast, the latter narrative prioritizes conflict resolution and the 
achievement of a modus vivendi with Russia. It assumes that nations cannot 
reasonably be expected to abandon their core beliefs and traditions, and 
therefore follows George F. Kennan’s 
advice, “to let Russians be Russians, 
and not try to substitute our conscience 
for theirs.”92 
The former deems it natural to 
instruct Russians on how to behave, 
and to demand that they confess to 
their crimes and accept their punish-
ment.93 The latter listens to Russia’s 
point of view because it is convinced 
that no truly global agenda can exist 
without Russia’s voice being a part of it. 
The former takes the benevolence 
of American hegemony for granted, 
and is deeply rooted in the ideology of American exceptionalism.94 The 
latter accepts the possibility of a post-hegemonic world order and agrees, 
Russophobia is thus a 
by-product of American 
exceptionalism, and unless 
we contain both, in the 
coming years we are likely 
to see conflicts similar to 
the ones we now have with 
Russia, multiplied the world 
over.
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in some sense, with Vladimir Putin that, “it is extremely dangerous to 
encourage people to see themselves as exceptional, whatever the motiva-
tion… We are all different, but when we ask for the Lord’s blessings, we 
must not forget that God created us equal.”95
Russophobia is thus a by-product of American exceptionalism, and 
unless we contain both, in the coming years we are likely to see conflicts 
similar to the ones we now have with Russia, multiplied the world over.
We could start by taking the following four steps: 
First, highlight the danger of abandoning dialogue in the pursuit of 
short-term advantages. Richard Ned Lebow, professor at King’s College 
London, makes the case that, from time immemorial, hubris, the arrogance 
which rises in proportion to power, inexorably leads countries to catas-
trophe.96 The failure to recognize this process as it is unfolding may well be 
inherent to the tragic nature of politics. Nevertheless, scholars should alert 
political leaders to the dangers of hubris, in the hope that the damage can 
be limited.
Second, challenge those who peremptorily declare an end to debate 
about Russia. One former U.S. ambassador to Russia is well known for 
proclaiming that the “debate is now over,” since as he puts it, “everybody 
in my world agrees.”97 
Such statements are a disservice to us all. The suppression of dissent 
in the name of national unity, or the national interest, is an old practice 
that should be exposed for what it is—an attempt to narrow the public 
debate by labeling other points of view as illegitimate.98
Third, avoid moralism, so that the search for compromise is not 
automatically equated with treason. It is instructive to contrast the typical 
American politician’s response to alleged Russian cyberattacks, with that 
of French President Emmanuel Macron who, after criticizing Russia for 
interfering in the French elections, nevertheless asserted:
Having said that, Russia is a partner. We have to work with Russia. 
It’s impossible to fix the Syrian situation without Russia. It’s very 
hard to fix the North Korean situation without Russia. And Russia 
has to be respected given its place, its history and our relationship…. 
If you want to make this global environment functioning, you have 
to deal with Russia.99
Macron is reminding his audience that disagreements need not be 
turned into crusades. This would be a very beneficial message for Americans 
to hear from their political leaders as well.
Finally, humanize our adversaries, so that meaningful dialogue with 
them becomes possible. Until the recent Skripal poisoning incident, this 
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view was actually becoming fairly widespread in Europe. Take, for example, 
the Green Party/Alliance 90 platform during the last German election:
Our stance is to make clear that we feel bound to people in Russia 
by bonds of friendship…. Our criticism of the Kremlin and of Putin 
is not a criticism of Russia and its people. Rather, we must intensify 
our encounters with her…. The old demand to facilitate exchanges 
between Russia and the EU, and to ease visa rules, is therefore more 
topical than ever for us.100
To sum up, a radical re-conceptualization of relations with Russia 
is long overdue. The Cold War will not simply fade away. It must be 
unlearned. This will require more contact with Russia, not less. 
While Americans have clung tenaciously to the emotional safety 
blanket of containment, the world has changed. Russia has emerged as the 
world’s six largest economy (PPP). Over the course of the next decade, it 
is also likely to be, simultaneously, Europe’s largest export market, China’s 
largest energy supplier, and India’s largest arms supplier.101
We must find a way to escape the mental straight jacket of the Cold 
War in order to forge the partnerships that America needs to remain an 
influential global power throughout the twenty-first century. Two decades 
ago, James H. Billington eloquently spelled out the consequences of failing 
to do so:
If Americans cannot penetrate into the interior spiritual dialogue of 
other peoples, they will never be able to understand, let alone antici-
pate or affect, the discontinuous major changes which are the driving 
forces in history and which will probably continue to spring unex-
pected traps in the years ahead. To put it another way, if we cannot 
learn to listen to others as they whisper their prayers, we may well 
confront them later on when they howl their war cries.102 f
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